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This article seeks to reconceptualise approaches to assessing children’s capacity, particularly 
in light of Article 5 of the CRC, which enshrines the principle of the evolving capacities of 
the child. Professionals regularly assess children’s capacity, for example when doctors treat 
children, or when lawyers represent child clients. They usually do this assessment intuitively 
however, as there is little guidance on how assessment should work in practice. Medical law 
in England and Wales serves as a case study to examine law and practice as well as 
challenges in the area. It is concluded that it may not necessarily be possible to objectively 
measure children’s capacity, and it may need to be done intuitively. Yet it should be done via 
a process which is rights-based. An approach to children’s capacity is proposed through four 
concepts based on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: Autonomy, Evidence, 
Support and Protection. 
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There are many areas of law and practice in which the capacity of children (that is, under-
18s) comes into question. Capacity may be considered in an everyday context to establish 
that children understand a medical procedure or another process affecting them. Or it may 
concern a significant point of law and therefore come to court. Capacity issues can arise in 
relation to such matters as deprivation of liberty for children with mental health problems 
(see In the matter of D (A Child) [2019] UKSC 42); where a child wishes to instruct her own 
lawyer (S v SBH (Appeal FPR 16.5: Sufficiency of Child’s Understanding) [2019] EWHC 
634); or where a child’s capacity to consent to medical treatment is in question (An NHS 
Foundation Trust v A & Others [2014] EWHC 920).  
 
In the everyday context, professionals make the decisions necessary in order to work in 
children’s interests. In England and Wales the ‘Gillick competence’ standard ostensibly 
guides these processes. Yet it remains the case that what children’s capacity actually entails is 
little understood – it has proven notoriously hard to define (Hein, et al., 2015[a]; Lansdown, 
2005; Alderson and Montgomery, 1996: 11). To a large extent, those working with children 
and/or relevant laws work around capacity – applying experience and instinct – 
acknowledging capacity without knowing much about relevant research or theory. This 
intuitive approach is generally satisfactory and, in most cases, adults make a judgment about 
a child’s capacity and problems do not arise (in the medical context see further e.g. Hein et 
al., 2015[a]; Cave and Stavrinides, 2013: 12).  
 




Capacity is the point on which many of children’s rights and responsibilities turn, however, 
as sometimes a definitive capacity/no capacity judgment is required on a given matter. One 
important consideration in this area is that approaches to understanding and assessing 
capacity should be guided by the primary international children’s rights instrument, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Article 5 states that parents and other 
responsible adults are to guide children in the exercise of their rights ‘in a manner consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child’. Yet despite the influence of the CRC, and despite 
the everyday nature of children’s capacity issues, little thought has been given by theorists, 
lawyers and others to understanding how and whether children’s capacity can be assessed in a 
rights-based way via the CRC.  
 
This article seeks to reconceptualise approaches to assessing children’s capacity, particularly 
in light of Article 5 of the CRC. Law and practice in England and Wales, and particularly 
medical law, serve as a case study through which to examine what capacity means in relation 
to children. After considering some relevant points of law and practice in this area, it is 
argued that efforts by professionals, theorists and others to understand capacity should be 
done via a process which is explicitly rights-based. The CRC after all represents the ‘hard-
won consensus of the global community’ (Lundy, 2007: 933) and should therefore be at the 
forefront of law and practice concerning children, particularly in areas as ill-understood, 
contested and fundamental to the exercise of rights as capacity. An approach to children’s 
capacity is proposed through four concepts based on the CRC: Autonomy, Evidence, Support 
and Protection.  
 
1 The Complex Terrain of Children’s Capacity in Medical Law 
 
Many commentators in the past decade have criticised the binary approach to capacity, that 
is, the idea that one has capacity or not (see e.g. Herring, 2016; Donnelly, 2010; Foster, 
2009). There have also been critiques of the fact that efforts to understand children’s capacity 
tend to position rational adulthood as the ultimate goal in child development (Cordero Arce, 
2015). Nevertheless in some cases a yes or no answer is required to determine, for example, 
whether or not a child can directly instruct a lawyer, or consent to treatment. Therefore 
sometimes children’s capacity must be assessed, because their autonomy rights depend on it. 
Herring argues powerfully why an accurate assessment of capacity is important:  
 
First, you could be assessed to lack capacity when you do not… You lose control over 
your life. But second, you could be assessed to have capacity when you do not have it. 
You could suffer harms and injuries and you would be told that that was your 
choice… (Herring, 2016: 55). 
 
Medical law has served as the main vehicle through which children’s capacity has been 
examined because medical consent is treated with great seriousness (Alderson, 1994: 46); it is 
linked to the right to bodily integrity – a ‘powerful principle which states that, except in a few 
situations, one person cannot touch another person’ (Herring, 2016: 45). This article centres 
around medical consent in England and Wales therefore, as children’s capacity has been 
considered in this area by courts and commentators to an extent unseen in other areas such as 
family law (Daly, 2018: 310). 
 




The term ‘capacity’ (sometimes used interchangeably with ‘competence’
1
) is used 
colloquially to refer one’s cognitive abilities, i.e. mental processes such as knowing, judging 
and evaluating. This will be the definition of capacity for the purpose of this article unless 
otherwise indicated. However it is important to note that there are two elements of capacity – 
1) legal capacity, referring to the standard for someone to make legally effective decisions; 
and 2) mental capacity, which refers to judgments about decision-making skills (Ruck-
Keene, et al., 2019: 58), denoting more of a sliding scale than a legal standard.  
 
‘Legal capacity’ is used in the legal sphere to denote the standard for someone to make 
legally effective decisions, for example under the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 – the 
statutory framework in England and Wales for adults whose capacity to make specific 
decisions is in doubt – or ‘Gillick competence’ for children under 16 years where they 
understand fully the matter at hand. Childhood in England and Wales has been defined as 
those under 18 years (General Medical Council, 2015). Adults are assumed to have capacity, 
and under-18s are generally legally assumed to lack it, on the basis that they ostensibly do not 
have the cognitive abilities to make decisions.  
 
There are exceptions to this of course. In the medical arena alone obvious exceptions are 
evident – the age of consent to medical treatment in England and Wales is 16 (Family Law 
Reform Act 1969, s.8), and the MCA includes 16 and 17 year olds. However in reality under-
16s also need medical treatment, and they may need it independent of parental guidance. To 
deal with this reality, Gillick competence is relied upon to determine whether under-16s can 
themselves consent to treatment. Gillick has also become the standard for questions of 
children’s capacity in other areas of the law such as decision making in the context of public 
and private family proceedings (S v SBH, para. 51); and has had significant influence in other 
common law jurisdictions (Cave, 2014: 114). 
 
It is not always easy to define exactly what ‘capacity’ entails in practice, however. To turn to 
the MCA, it requires that an individual understands information but also retains, uses, weighs 
it; and communicates a decision (Section 3[1]). Many theorists have written about the MCA 
and the challenges of pinning down exactly what capacity (in the case of adults) might be and 
how to assess it (see e.g. Banner, 2013: 74-76; Donnelly, 2010: 142; Foster, 2009). Of 
ascertaining what capacity entails, Herring notes: ‘This is clearly not a straightforward issue. 
The courts have avoided issuing general guidance’ (2016: 46).  
 
Similarly there is a lack of elaboration beyond Gillick as to what children’s capacity involves 
(Lansdown, 2005: xi). In the Gillick case (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority [1986] AC 112) it was determined in England and Wales that doctors could provide 
contraceptive treatment to girls where they were deemed by the doctor to have ‘sufficient 
understanding and intelligence’ to ‘understand fully what is proposed’ (at 253). In An NHS 
Foundation Trust Hospital v P the court described Gillick competence as ‘having a state of 
maturity, intelligence and understanding sufficient to enable her to take a decision as to 
medical treatment for herself’ ([2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam): para. 12). 
 
This appears to require a high level of understanding of what is involved in the matter in 
question. In Gillick the court elaborated that many factors beyond the medical advice would 
                                                          
1
 The term ‘competence’ to denote the legal standard has decreased in use in recent years, presumably because 
of the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which uses the term ‘capacity’. Confusingly regarding the 
legal standard in the case of children, the term ‘Gillick competence’ is still used, although not exclusively. In X. 
(A Child) [2014] EWHC 1871: para. 12, for example, it was referred to as ‘Gillick capacity’. 




have to be understood for a child to have legal capacity to consent to such treatment. She 
would have to understand ‘moral and family questions, especially her relationship with her 
parents, long-term problems associated with the emotional impact of pregnancy and its 
termination.’ In Re H (A Minor) (Role of Official Solicitor) the court pointed to a similarly 
high level of understanding to instruct a lawyer: a child must have sufficient understanding to 
participate as a party in the proceedings which means much more than instructing a solicitor 
but also possibly give evidence and be cross-examined ([1993] 2 FLR 552: 554H).  
 
There persists a lack of clarity surrounding the application of Gillick in practice, however. It 
seems that professionals are not always clear as to what exactly capacity for children entails 
whether it be in the area of medicine (Cave, 2014; Cave and Stavrinedes, 2014: 16; Ashteka 
et al., 2007: 632); in family law (Cashmore and Parkinson, 2009: 20-21); or social work 
(Thomas and O’Kane, 1998: 151). Yet for the most part the ability of children to consent to 
medical treatment is determined implicitly (Hein et al., 2015[a]); ‘day in and day out…as part 
of routine’ (Appendix to A (A Child) [2014] EWFHC 1445 (Fam)). Indeed, Gillick refers to 
the discretion of the clinician to treat children and to refrain from contacting parents (174B-
D) – so it is ultimately about enabling professional discretion rather than offering a clear 
means for assessing capacity.  
 
Although implicit assessment generally suffices, the lack of clarity about what capacity 
entails can sometimes pose a problem. Disagreements can arise between patients and doctors 
about treatment, though this may not reach the public eye (Cave and Stavrinides, 2013: 5). 
There can then be differences of opinions between professionals as to whether the child 
actually has capacity (note disagreements between clinicians in An NHS Foundation Trust 
Hospital v P: para. 9; and A (A Child) [2014]: para. 8; and between lawyers in S v SBH).  
 
2 Considering What Capacity Entails 
 
It seems that there is no quick-fix definition for professionals, then, of what capacity is, 
whether in the mental capacity or the legal capacity sense. Yet one can look to guidance from 
various quarters. In Ontario, Canada, a presumption of capacity applies to adults and 
children. A single test for capacity exists under the Health Care Consent Act 1996 Section 
4(1), that is whether ‘the person is able to understand the information that is relevant to 
making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal assistance service, as the case 
may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack 
of decision.’ The key points seem to be about understanding information and consequences. 
Practice guidance advises nurses to use ‘professional judgment and common sense to 
determine whether the client is able to understand the information’ (College of Nurses of 
Ontario, 2017: 9). 
 
In England and Wales, the MCA (Section 3[1]) as noted above reflects the test involving four 
elements which is often relied upon when the question arises as to whether an adult’s 
capacity is in doubt (see Hein et al., 2015[a] and Grisso et al., 1997). It requires that an 
individual understands information but also retains, uses, weighs it and communicates a 
decision. Even when it comes to clarifying what the standards are for adults, ‘there is 
surprisingly little discussion in the theoretical and empirical literature’ on what a procedurally 
rational decision-making process would look like (Banner, 2013: 74-76).  The courts set out 
what the inability, rather than the ability entails (see consideration of the case law in 
Donnelly, 2010: 142). The case law is strikingly focused on impairment, as this must be 
present for incapacity to be determined under the MCA (Section 2). Therefore MCA case law 




is not well suited for a more constructive consideration of children’s capacity outside of the 
impairment context. The MCA is noted by the court to be ‘hardly of direct relevance’ in 
relation to a child instructing a lawyer in S v SBH (para. 62), although the factors are briefly 
considered (see also the comparison in S (Child as Parent - Adoption - Consent) [2017] 
EWHC 2729 (Fam)). 
 
An increasing number of tools have been developed to bring greater objectivity to 
assessments of decision-making abilities for consent to treatment and clinical research in 
adults, such as the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT, see 
Dunne et al., 2006). The research of Hein et al. (2015[a] and [b]) sought to determine 
whether a tool for assessing ‘competence to consent’ to medical treatment could be used with 
children. The tool requires that the assessor assign numerical scores when examining the four 
elements of capacity – (1) understanding information; (2) reasoning about choices; (3) 
appreciation of consequences; and (4) expressing a choice. There is little empirical research 
data on their efficacy, however. One study determined that the MacCAT modified for 
children was feasible (Koelch et al., 2010) but also that clinicians were more likely to 
determine capacity without reference to the tool than if they applied it. This points to the tool 
failing to capture something which a less clinical (and more personal, holistic) interaction 
does (Hein et al., 2014). These tools do not seem to provide much clarity, therefore, on what 
capacity entails in practice, and perhaps the tools facilitate assessments of capacity on paper, 
but reduce conclusions that children have capacity. 
 
Recent jurisprudence is another source of guidance on children’s capacity. In S v SBH [2019] 
the court outlined (at para. 64) the main factors relevant to the assessment of whether a child 
can directly instruct a lawyer in a family law case, rather than being assigned a guardian to 
instruct the lawyer on the child’s interests: i)  intelligence; ii)  emotional maturity; iii) factors 
which might undermine their understanding such as their emotional state; iv) their reasons for 
wishing to instruct a solicitor directly; v) potential undue influence; vi) their understanding of 
the process of litigation; vii) the risk of harm to the child from participation. These points are 
of course quite specific to instructing a lawyer. They are also perhaps demanding much from 
a child (and certainly more than is required from an adult wishing to instruct a solicitor) in 
order to reach the requisite standard of capacity. 
 
An NHS Foundation Trust v A & Others [2014] highlights the court’s ad hoc approach to 
capacity in a medical law context. It concerned the medical treatment of a 16-year-old girl 
(‘A’) whose life was in immediate danger because of her disordered relationship with food. 
Two psychiatric reports established that the girl lacked capacity to make decisions about 
medical treatment and the court relayed the evidence as follows: 
 
It was concluded that A struggled to make decisions about her own care and presently 
suffered from a disorder of mind or brain … In Dr G’s analysis there was no evidence 
that any further time would alleviate the problem or effectively assist in aiding A’s 
understanding (paras. 14-15) … [She] had shown no capacity to focus on her 
emotional feelings or the ‘powerless nature of her own situation’. Dr G told me that A 
presented as a much younger girl, sometimes petulant and child like … she lacks a 
real appreciation that unless immediate action is taken that she will die (para. 41). 
 




The court did not consider Gillick competence,
2
 it instead expressed that A’s wishes were 
important (para. 12), particularly since use of force was being sanctioned by the court. The 
court referenced the MCA although acknowledged it would not be applied in her case, 
presumably because she was under 18, although the fact that the MCA applies to 16 and 17 
year olds was not mentioned in the judgment (bearing in mind A was 16 years old).
3
 The 
elaboration of why she does not have capacity is somewhat vague and subjective, referring 
for example to perceived immaturity (‘petulan[ce]’).  
 
In another 2014 case, A (A Child) [2014] EWFHC 1445 (Fam), the question was whether a 13 
year old had the capacity to consent to a termination. This time Gillick competence was 
explicitly considered. A psychiatrist again provided evidence and, on this occasion, 
convinced the court that the girl had capacity to consent, although other doctors involved 
were in doubt (para. 8). She was deemed by him to have capacity as: 
 
[S]he fully understood the implications of the options; the risks … she was able to 
explain to him that her wish was to terminate the pregnancy as she felt that she could 
not cope with its continuance … the decision that was reached by A was hers alone 
and was not the product of influence by adults in her family (paras. 13-14). 
 
In An NHS Foundation Trust v A & Others it is outlined that the 16 year old does not 
understand the consequences of refusing treatment. In A (A Child) it is outlined that the 13 
year old does understand. Some convincing reasons are provided for these conclusions. 
Nevertheless a somewhat ad hoc approach to considering capacity is evident in such 
judgments, in that the court does not have a standard approach. It does not rely upon any kind 
of checklist, for example. Gillick competence may or may not be explicitly mentioned. 
Elements of the MCA 2005 may or may not feature.  
 
It seems very difficult, therefore, to ascertain how a professional is to apply an objective and 
standardised approach in an informal assessment of a child’s capacity. This is particularly the 
case when we bear in mind that in both of these cases – An NHS Foundation Trust v A & 
Others and A (A Child)) – expert psychiatrists were introduced and therefore the assessments 
could be described as formal,
4
 and yet a fairly ad hoc approach to assessing capacity is 
evident in the judgments. Some such cases show that experts may even be in disagreement 
with each other as to whether a child has capacity (see An NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v 
P; A (A Child); and S v SBH), demonstrating all the more how difficult it may be for a non- 
psychology/psychiatry expert to make such a determination.  
 
Consider also the difficulties in defining capacity for adults, as well as the fact that 
standardised tests such as the MacCAT do not provide a definitive objective measure of 
capacity. It is telling that the courts in S v SBH, after outlining elements to consider when 
determining a child’s capacity to instruct a lawyer, stated that ‘[i]nevitably the evaluation is 
more an art than a science and the weight to be given to each component cannot be 
                                                          
2
 Neither did the court refer to Gillick when making an order for treatment on a 12 year old in X Health 
Authority v D [2019] EWHC 2311 (Fam). In F (Mother) v F (Father) [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam) in which the 
court made an order to inoculate adolescent girls against their wishes neither the words competence nor capacity 
were even explicitly referenced. Nor is Gillick. 
3
 In An NHS Foundation Trust Hospital v P [2014] EWHC 1650 however the court did apply the MCA when 
making an order for treatment on a 17 year old. 
4
 This reliance on experts appears to generally occur in only the most serious of medical law cases (although in 
the most acrimonious family law cases psychologist and other expert evidence is very occasionally introduced, 
see Daly, 2018: 299). 




arithmetically totted up’ (para. 80). It seems that perhaps an intuitive assessment of a child’s 
capacity (based on experience and impressions) is inevitable in some practice contexts, and 
that attempting to quantify or to be overly rigid in defining capacity is unhelpful. Or perhaps 
it is possible to apply a solid definition but one has not yet been established to a satisfactory 
degree. In any case professionals would benefit from a framework in which to work when 
assessing or understanding a child’s capacity, and it is important that this framework is based 
in children’s rights. 
 
3 Considering Children’s Capacity Rights  
 
One important source for better understanding capacity is the CRC. The term ‘evolving 
capacities’ in Article 5 implies the CRC’s recognition and appreciation of the sliding scale of 
capacities that children move through as they grow to adulthood. Though ‘the evolving 
capacities of the child’ is not defined in the Convention, the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (‘the Committee’) opines that it refers to ‘processes of maturation and learning 
whereby children progressively acquire knowledge, competencies and understanding, 
including acquiring understanding about their rights and about how they can best be realized’ 
(General Comment No. 7: para. 17).  
 
Article 5 is a ground breaking provision of the CRC. Lansdown points out that traditionally, 
it was assumed that adults were the primary agents for protecting children, and that children 
were seen as mere recipients; but that ‘the reality is more complex, involving a dynamic 
process that recognises children’s capacities to contribute towards their own protection and 
allows them to build on their strengths’ (Lansdown, 2005: 41). It is highly significant then 
that Article 5 positions parents not as owners or even solely protectors of their children, but, 
similar to the Gillick case, as holders in trust of children’s rights. The parental role will 
change as the child matures and develops abilities and desires to exercise rights on her own 
behalf. Article 5 then ‘transforms the role of the parent from primary rights-holder over their 
child, to duty-bearer to their child in the child’s exercise of her rights under the UNCRC’ 
(Varadan, 2019: 320).   
 
Article 5 may place emphasis on the position of parents but it envisages a balancing of 
children’s autonomy and protection rights in accordance with their capacities (Lansdown 
2005). We can infer from this that children themselves have ‘capacity rights’ under Article 5 
in that, on relevant matters, the extent of their capacity must be considered and they should be 
given the freedom to make their own decisions to the extent possible.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that what constitutes capacity is a contested matter, and that there are 
no quick-fix definitions of capacity, it can be said that efforts to understand it should be 
grounded in the CRC. With the intuitive, informal approach to assessing children’s capacity 
in mind, I am therefore proposing a rights-based model, based on the CRC, to guide 
assessment or understanding of a child’s or children’s capacity in a rights framework.  
 
The model below proposes that in order for professionals to take a rights-based approach to 
assessing or understanding the capacity of a child or of children generally, they should 
consider the following concepts: 
 
1. Autonomy (Article 12): Children have autonomy rights, and to deny them their 
wishes should be considered a matter of seriousness. 




2. Evidence (Article 2): Decision-makers should have basic knowledge about childhood 
including psychology and other relevant theories. 
3. Support (Article 5): Capacity can be increased through appropriate support, 
guidance and information. 
4. Protection (Article 3): Children are a group who are in a unique position of relative 
vulnerability and adults are obliged to offer them protection from harm. 
 
All of these concepts have been specifically situated in this model via various ‘cross-cutting 
standards’ (Hanson and Lundy, 2017: 301) or provisions of the CRC. It must be borne in 
mind that CRC rights are indivisible and interdependent, however, so there will be 
overlapping elements to these points. Some further sub-headings have been included to assist 
assessment – under concept 1. Autonomy, ‘accord due weight to views’ is instructed, for 
example. These points are not intended to be exhaustive however, as each capacity 
assessment will need to be tailored to the specific context such as a determination of capacity 
to consent to medical treatment, to participate in legal proceedings, and so on. 
 
 
Figure 1 Children’s Capacity Rights 
 




3.1 Autonomy (Article 12 Right to be Heard) 
 
Understand Autonomy Rights 
 
When assessing or understanding a child’s capacity it is important to be aware of the 
importance of autonomy to all individuals, including children (see X Health Authority v D: 
para. 12 and S v SBH: para. 63). Autonomy – the ideal that we should decide our own destiny 
to the extent possible – is the most valued characteristic for the individual in a liberal 
democracy (see Daly, 2018). Evidence indicates that it is inherently good for wellbeing. 
Greater autonomy has been found to be correlated positively with a variety of outcomes for 
children, particularly where they make decisions together with adults (Bindman, Pomerantz 
and Roisman, 2015: 775). There are laws upholding autonomy and social policies based 
around it.  
 
Capacity is often the gateway to autonomy. For example being determined Gillick competent 
may permit you to access the treatment you wish to have. Assessing capacity therefore 
requires an understanding that denying children autonomy should be taken seriously, as it is 
for adults (Daly, 2018). This requires that capacity assessment contains an understanding that 
a child is supported to understand the matter at hand before they are deemed to lack capacity 
(see further 3.3 below). It also requires that the nature of the decision is considered – less 
serious issues will likely require lower levels of understanding for children to be deemed 
capable of making decisions (see further 3.4 below). 
 
There has been resistance to an overly-individualistic liberal notion of the autonomous 
individual in medical law (see e.g. Donnelly, 2016: 322; Herring, 2016; Foster, 2009). Yet a 
relational approach can be taken to autonomy which can provide a more holistic and less 
individualistic approach to it. There are various accounts of relational autonomy. Donnelly 
(2016: 322) opines that a useful unifying concept is that advanced by Christman, (2004: 147): 
a conception of autonomy is uniquely relational when ‘among its defining conditions are 
requirements concerning the interpersonal or social environment of the agent’. 
Understandings of children’s autonomy and capacity, therefore, requires acceptance that we 
are all defined through our relationships with others and through the environments in which 
we are operating (see further 3.3 below). 
 
Hearing All Children 
 
Article 12 of the CRC requires that states ‘shall assure’ to children the right to be heard 
(Article 12[1]), and in particular children should be ‘provided the opportunity’ in proceedings 
affecting them (Article 12[2]). Although autonomy is not explicitly mentioned in the CRC, 
Article 12 taken together with Article 5 can be interpreted as meaning that children should 
have autonomy to the extent possible. When assessing a child’s capacity, hearing what they 
have to say will be crucial. This will provide information about whether a child has made a 
decision, what their wishes are, and of course give indications as to their mental capacity. The 
Committee also makes the point that states should not just ensure children are heard, but also 
positively encourage children to provide views (General Comment No. 12: para. 11). 
Communication for the purpose of assessing capacity should therefore be encouraged. 
 
There are different conceptions of the age at which it is appropriate to hear children’s views, 
but even young children can form views and express wishes. There is no age limit set by 
Article 12 for extending to a child the right to be heard; the text refers solely to the child 




‘capable of forming his or her own views’ without designating a specific cut-off point. 
Therefore children must be assumed capable of forming views (this is not the same as 
assuming that a child has legal capacity), and children must be informed about the fact that 
they are in possession of this right to be heard (ibid, para. 20). The Committee defines ‘young 
children’ as those up to eight years of age, and states that their participation rights mean that 
adults must ‘show patience and creativity by adapting their expectations to a young child's 
interests, level of understanding and preferred ways of communicating’ (General Comment 
No. 5: para. 11[c]). Even children who clearly do not have capacity can potentially provide 
views through communication such as play or art (see General Comment No. 12: para 21; and 
Daly, 2018: 49). 
 
In order to assess children’s capacity, professionals must engage in communication in ‘a child 
friendly manner’
 
(Day of General Discussion on the Right to be Heard, para. 40). There are 
now guidelines in many areas of practice as to how to communicate with children, for 
example in legal proceedings (see e.g. the Council of Europe Guidelines on child-friendly 
justice, 2010).  
 
According Due Weight to Views: Participation without Full Capacity 
 
Part of facilitating children’s autonomy rights is to ensure not just that children are heard, but 
that what they say is given due weight. The Committee states that ‘simply listening to the 
child is insufficient’, but that the views of the child have to be seriously considered (General 
Comment No. 12: para. 28). There are also obligations to provide children with feedback and 
information on the position of their views in the outcome of decisions (ibid, para. 45). There 
must therefore always be some level of weight accorded to their views (Daly, 2018). Even if 
hearing a child indicates that she is not Gillick competent, her views should still be given due 
weight in accordance with Article 12.  
 
Participation has become a key notion associated with Article 12 – the right to be heard 
means that children should enjoy participation in an all matters affecting them (General 
Comment No. 12: 86). The notion of participation is highly relevant to children’s capacity, as 
the principle of the evolving capacities of the child mean that children have a right to 
participate to the extent possible – the level of their of involvement will accord with their 
mental capacity. Children should not simply be ‘assessed’, however, they should be 
supported to participate, as is outlined in Section 3.3 below. This should be the case for even 
young children who can have sophisticated knowledge of their medical condition, particularly 
if they have had a serious illness for some time. In these circumstances they may develop 
decision-making capacities that far exceed expectations of children of their age group 
(Alderson and Montgomery, 1996).  
 
3.2 Evidence (Article 2 Non-Discrimination) 
 
Refraining from Discriminating Against Children as a Group 
 
Article 2 of the CRC requires states to ensure that rights are secured: ‘to each child within 
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind’ noting characteristics such as, race, 
colour, sex, ‘or other status’. The emphasis here is often on characteristics such as race but 
‘other status’ can also be interpreted to include age, that is, the status of the child as a child. 
 




There is a strong non-discrimination movement in the area of disability rights, gender and 
race, but the unfair treatment of children on the basis that they are under 18 years is little 
examined, considered, or discussed in the sphere of children’s rights (Daly, 2018), though the 
Committee has on occasion emphasised discriminatory attitudes against adolescents (General 
Comment No. 20, para. 21). In efforts to understand capacity, greater attention must be given 
to the part played by adult attitudes to children and how this effects perceptions of the 
capacity of individual children, as well as children generally. 
 
Contemporary scholarship provides evidence that children are not undeveloped adults. They 
are complete entities who are deserving of respect. Childhood of course has a biological 
component. Yet it is now accepted, due to scholarship rooted in childhood studies, that 
childhood is to some extent constructed. Such constructions have tended to underestimate 
children’s capacity and ability to exercise agency in their own lives (Prout and James, 1990: 
7–33). Alderson and Montgomery state that the greatest obstacles to children’s capacity 
likely arise from prejudices about children, and beliefs that it is unwise to listen to children 
(1996: 58).  Children’s relative inexperience does render them vulnerable and they require 
special protections. However they are frequently denied opportunities for decision making in 
accordance with their evolving capacities (Lansdown, 2005: 31). 
 
Non-discrimination in capacity assessment will therefore involve awareness of and resistance 
to discriminatory attitudes against children as a group. Koh-Peters (2018) in her work 
representing children in child protection proceedings poses questions ‘to keep us honest’ such 
as: if one is treating this client or patient differently because she is a child, then why is that? 
Is it justifiable? A positive example of non-discrimination in the specific context of 
consideration of children’s evolving capacities is noted in New Zealand by Lansdown (2005: 
53). There the Ministry for Youth Affairs developed guidelines for government departments 
and public bodies when considering age-limits in law and policy. Various prompting 
questions are encouraged, including: ‘Does the age-limit discriminate against young people?’ 
noting that ‘[i]t is not acceptable to treat young people differently just because of their age.’ 
 
Applying the principle of non-discrimination when considering a child’s capacity also means 
refraining from an overly conservative application of Gillick and other standards of 
assessment of capacity. Being ‘fully’ informed, as Gillick requires, is beyond the 
requirements for an adult, who simply needs to be aware in broad terms of the nature of the 
treatment (Rogers v Whitaker [1992] 175 CLR 479, 489; see also S (Child as Parent - 
Adoption - Consent) [2017], para. 60). The court in S v SBH advocates ‘a shift away from a 
paternalistic approach in favour of an approach which gives significantly more weight to the 
autonomy of the child in the evaluation of whether they have sufficient understanding’ (para. 
63). Careful consideration should be given to a child’s capacity in circumstances such as 
obtaining consent for medical treatment. Yet one should avoid an overly stringent 
interpretation of what a child’s understanding entails. 
 
Supporting Marginalised Children  
 
Lundy, (2007: 934-935) emphasises that participation rights should not be afforded only to 
articulate and literate children. The Committee provides evidence of the particular need to 
guarantee the participation of children with disabilities.  This is important when it comes to 
assessing capacity, as adults may have difficulty accepting that a child with disabilities might 
have capacity (1997, para. 334). It is also the case that children with language barriers: 
‘minority, indigenous and migrant children and other children who do not speak the majority 




language’ (General Comment No 12: para. 21) may struggle to have their capacity taken 
seriously, for example in the context of immigration cases. 
 
It is not simply the case that the capacities of marginalised children may be underestimated; 
there may also be less sense of a duty to support and maximise the capacity of these groups. 
Lansdown points to the fact that children from minority groups may experience negative 
assumptions about their capacity and their ability to learn (2005: 30). Yet there are particular 
obligations to ensure that marginalised groups are supported to have their views and 
understandings made clear. The Committee emphasises that children with disabilities have a 
right to ‘any mode of communication necessary to facilitate the expression of their views’ 
and also that particular efforts must also be made to support children with language issues 
(General Comment No 12: para. 21). 
 
Understand Child Development: Theory and Unknowns  
 
It is important to remain critical of the notion that children’s capacity can be measured in a 
straightforward way considering the fraught and contested nature of the concept of capacity 
in the case law and literature outlined above. Yet the Committee states that professionals 
working with children should have the relevant training, including on children’s capacities 
(General Comment No. 20: para 37[e]). It is therefore useful to briefly consider what claims 
are made within developmental psychology and in empirical research about children’s 
evolving capacities, in order to determine the relevance of those claims and findings for how 
the law approaches and treats children. This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of what psychology and neuroscience can tell us about capacity, but rather serves to 
provide an overview of relevant evidence from these fields of study. 
 
It is important to emphasise, as the Committee does, that ‘age alone cannot determine the 
significance of a child’s views’ and that other factors such as experience will also be 
significant (General Comment No. 12: para. 29). Much of the thinking around children’s 
decision-making abilities however revolves around what children should be expected to do 
within their particular age range. Piaget’s ‘stage theory’ (see e.g. Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) 
is prevalent within developmental psychology. Piaget worked on developing early IQ testing 
with Alfred Binet (an intelligence quotient [IQ] is a score based on standardised tests to 
assess human intelligence). Piaget noticed that children of approximately the same age have a 
tendency to engage in similar behaviours. Piaget’s work was novel, and increased perceptions 
that children’s cognition was worth understanding. However he has been criticised as 
underestimating children’s abilities, and later theorists such as Vygotsky (1978) and 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) have placed greater emphasis on the importance of the environment 
of the child as opposed to particular stages of development. There is continued 
acknowledgement nevertheless that ages and stages are important in understanding the 
cognitive development of children (Gay Hartman, 2000: 1285). Rutter and Rutter (1993: 195) 
make the point that no amount of training or environmental fine-tuning will enable a four-
month old baby to walk.  
 
Since Piaget, many researchers have further examined what children can generally do at 
certain ages. Empirical research and advances in neurobiology have added to the body of 
evidence (see also Kilkelly in this special issue). In general the evidence paints a complex 
picture and it is important to remember that developmental psychology is theory rather than 
fact. However there are some trends in the findings that we can point to. It is also important 
to acknowledge that the question ‘what can children be expected to know/decide at a 




particular age?’ is very common, as we tend to have a preoccupation with age. This 
inescapable question therefore requires a response, and the response should involve both 
available evidence, and an appeal for balance, in that factors besides age must also be 
considered. 
 
From birth to age two, Piaget stated that children are in the ‘sensorimotor stage’ whereby 
they experience the world through movement and their senses. Babies are conscious and 
active agents who alter environments, families, relationships (Alderson and Montgomery, 
1996). Their experiences are to be taken seriously but they are not going to have capacity to 
consent to medical treatment, for example. The ‘preoperational’ stage continues from age two 
to seven whereby there is an increasing ability to use and represent objects through words and 
images (‘symbolic thinking’). Mental reasoning (that is solving problems and making 
decisions) is developing. It is thought, however, that children are expected to think in 
‘egocentric’ terms, that is, to have difficulty in considering the viewpoints of others, although 
they are increasingly gaining these skills. ‘Cognitive control’ – that is controlling your 
behaviour in line with your goals – is thought to be weak in children of this age (Kidd et al., 
2013) although more recent research (e.g. Murray et al., 2016; Blakemore, 2019: 149-154), 
points to the influence which environment, assistance and support has on the ability of 
children (and all individuals) to make more objectively ‘good’ decisions. 
 
Seven years appears to be a developmental turning point, and children from this age are 
considered for example capable of assenting (i.e. actively agreeing) to medical research (see 
e.g. Hein et al., 2015[b] and Varadan, this special issue). Children are developing 
metacognitive skills, that is, a more abstract and complex idea of identity and interests. 
Piaget, identifying a ‘concrete operational stage’ from seven to 11 years, pointed to the ability 
to think logically about concrete events from age seven, though he argued that children may 
still be unable to logically consider all outcomes.  
 
The research indicates another leap in development within this stage, at age nine. The 
research of Hein et al. indicates that those between 9.6 and 11.2 years are in a period of 
transition; they are developing important abilities but their maturity is not yet “effective” 
(2015[a] and [b]). Their research estimates that children of 11.2 years and above generally 
seemed to have the mental capacity necessary to consent to medical treatment, while children 
of 9.6 years and younger generally did not. Other research has been even more positive about 
abilities at this age. In Greenberg Garrison’s research examining children’s decisions in 
hypothetical scenarios concerning arrangements for children on family breakdown,
 
it was 
found that nine year olds were as rational as adults in their reasons for decision-making 
(1991: 78). 
 
‘Adolescence’ then is usually defined as puberty (around age 12) to age 18, which is the age 
of majority for most purposes. At some time around age 12, Piaget argued, children enter the 
‘formal operational stage,’ and abstract thought starts to become sophisticated. Individuals 
reason logically, draw conclusions from available information and apply to hypothetical 
situations all of these processes. Neuroscience likewise indicates that the thickening of the 
part of the brain involved in judgment and planning peaks at approximately age 11 in girls 
and age 12 in boys (Giedd, 2004). There is a consequent development of cognitive skills 
facilitating greater ability to develop hypothetical solutions, and the development of the 
means to choose the best one (Broome, 1999). Within this stage, 14 years appears to be a 
significant turning point for decision-making abilities (see e.g. Bosisio, 2008: 290). Some 
research indicates that 14 year olds’ ability to make decisions is as advanced as that of adults, 




when considering their understanding of the facts, their processes of decision making and 
their understanding of potential outcomes of choice (see e.g. Greenberg Garrison, 1991: 78).  
 
Other research points, however, to cognitive limitations which persist in adolescence. It 
indicates that the frontal lobes, which govern executive functions (cognitive processes in the 
brain responsible for reasoning and problem solving, helping us to prioritise, think ahead, and 
regulate emotion), matures in our early to mid-twenties (Lipstein et al., 2013). This has led to 
a new developmental period explored by researchers: ‘emerging adulthood’.  Evidence points 
to an important transition between 15 and 19 years (Scott et al., 1995). Weijers and Grisso 
(2009: 64) argue that the ‘lesser maturity of adolescents’ decision-making capacities may be 
linked to brain structures that also have not yet reached adult maturity’. This has led to 
theories that adolescents make riskier decisions than adults, even in medical treatment (see 
e.g. Lipstein et al., 2013). It is important to remember however that this does not write off all 
under-18s in terms of reasoning tasks: ‘It is not that these tasks cannot be done before young 
adulthood, but rather that [in adulthood] it takes less effort, and hence is more likely to 
happen.’
5
 Individual differences will dictate a lot – some individuals are risk-takers, whilst 
others are not (Blakemore, 2019: 134). 
 
Even when considered through the lens of developmental psychology then, the difficulties 
with measuring and defining capacity have to be acknowledged. Commentators question 
whether developmental psychology is objective and neutral, and the legitimacy of focusing 
on children reaching particular stages at particular times (Cordero Arce, 2015). Furthermore, 
it must be emphasised that capacity cannot be understood as located solely in the individual; 
it is highly dependent on the environment in which an individual is operating, and 
particularly whether they are receiving support to maximise capacity. 
 




Providing children with support and information will boost capacity. The level of assistance 
and support which children receive will likely be far more important than their decision-
making abilities per se: ‘Children’s capacities are very much an interactive and relational 
process of dialogue, determined as much by the “hearing” and “scaffolding” capacities of the 
adults they engage with as their own expressive capacities’ (Cashmore, 2011: 520). 
 
The Committee stipulates that states must ensure that a child receives all necessary 
information and advice to make a decision in favour of her or his best interests (General 
Comment No. 12: para. 16). Adults have duties to maximise children’s capacities, 
specifically because of the relative lack of experience of children: the Committee states that 
‘the child has a right to direction and guidance, which have to compensate for the lack of 
knowledge, experience and understanding of the child and are restricted by his or her 
evolving capacities’ (ibid, para. 84), although the meaning of ‘parental direction and 
guidance’ under Article 5 has remained largely without definition (Varadan, 2019). The 
Committee points to duties on adults to support capacity: the more the child knows, has 
experienced and understands, the more adults must move from ‘direction and guidance into 
                                                          
5
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reminders and advice’ and later to an approach to important issues as equals. This will 
‘steadily increase’ over time (General Comment No. 12: para. 84). 
 
In cases where adult capacity is at issue, there is an MCA duty to support capacity (in Section 
1[3]), although Ruck-Keene, et al., (2019) found that there is much more work to be done in 
achieving this. There is no comparable obligation in England and Wales in cases concerning 
children. In F (Mother) v F (Father) [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam) for example, two adolescent 
sisters and their mother were resisting vaccinations sought by the father for the girls. The 
court noted that the girls did not have ‘a rounded appreciation of the pros and cons of the 
vaccine’. Cave makes the points that the girls could have been given this information, and 
their capacity then considered (2014b: 639; see also S (Child as Parent - Adoption - Consent) 




Professionals should have some basic knowledge of theories around children, developmental 
psychology and capacity when working with children. The Committee states that when there 
are proceedings in relation to children, the capacity to form views has to be assessed (2009: 
para. 28) and that all personnel involved in proceedings regarding decision-making are to be 
trained in this regard (Day of General Discussion on the Right to be Heard: para. 41). 
Alderson suggests that a test should be required to determine whether practitioners 
understand children’s competence and how to enhance it. She suggests that the test should 
enquire as to whether a professional is able: ‘to understand all the relevant information; to 
retain and explain all the issues clearly and resolve misunderstandings; to assist children and 
parents in their reasoned choicemaking; and to respect their decisions, putting no undue 
pressures on them?’ (1994: 53).  
 
I consider elsewhere how ‘autonomy support’ can be used to assist children in decision-
making – that they should be provided with non-controlling, impartial information and 
support to form and/or express views and decisions (Daly, 2018: 418). There are a wealth of 
resources on maximising capacity and providing support which could be adapted for 
maximising children’s capacity. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities enshrines an obligation to support exercise of capacity (Article 12) rather than 
assuming abilities can be measured. Consequently decision-making support for those with 
cognitive disability has been incorporated into policy and legislation around the world.  
 
Guidance is available, for example, for implementing support under the MCA 2005. The 
Office of the Public Guardian (2013) states that, to support someone to make a decision for 
themselves, one must ask, does the person have all the relevant information they need? Do 
they understand alternatives? And has communication of the information been conducted 
well? In medical practice research has been conducted on supporting decision-making by 
ensuring quality of communication (Hein, I. et al., 2015[a]) and enhancing competence 
through various techniques such as breaking the process down into smaller but linked 
choices, and making the child feel valued (Larcher and Hutchinson, 2010: 309). Given the 
clear obligation under Article 5 of the CRC to support children’s decision-making (Varadan, 
2019: 329) it is crucial that professionals engage in supportive, capacity-maximising of this 
nature where capacity is being assessed. 
 
A basic understanding of child development is not only necessary to understand how to 
assess children’s capacity, it will also be important for understanding how to maximise the 




capacity of children of various ages through autonomy support. The Committee points out 
that ‘[c]onsideration needs to be given to the fact that children will need differing levels of 
support and forms of involvement according to their age and evolving capacities’ (2009: para. 
184) and assessors will have to have training in these points. This means that states have 
obligations to ensure training similar to that which is now common in the area of capacity 




Available research on children’s views indicates that they wish to jointly make decisions with 
parents and others rather than be the sole decision-maker (Alderson and Montgomery, 1996: 
2). It is considered good practice to involve the child’s family in the decision-making process, 
if the child consents to this (Department of Health, 2009: 33). Of course, children are 
particularly dependent on those close to them, socially, emotionally, financially and legally. It 
is important to ascertain that children are not under undue influence in the decision that they 
have made. This is complex, as choosing an option because it aligns with the interests of 
those close to you can still be ‘your own’ choice. Helpfully, courts make a distinction 
between this and ‘parroting’ the views of parents (see e.g. S v SBH: para. 64).  
 
Because of the relational nature of decision-making, there may legitimately be an element of 
‘persuasion’ to do the right thing. One can imagine scenarios in which this would be entirely 
appropriate. Consider, for example, where needle fear is preventing a child from accepting 
life-saving treatment which requires an injection (see e.g. Re M.B. (An Adult: Medical 
Treatment) ([1997] EWCA Civ 1361 where the patient was an adult). A child may need to be 
persuaded to endure the discomfort of an injection in order to avoid much greater harm. 
Research indicates that children’s attitudes to compulsion is more dependent on their 
relationship with parents and clinicians than the degree of compulsion (Tan et al., 2010), 
highlighting the importance of communication, and the intimate connection of capacity to 
factors such as trust and positive relationships. There is a difference between providing 
information and persuading on the one hand and coercing on the other however, and 
professionals should be aware of the power dynamics between adults and children. 
 
An assessment of capacity should include consideration of factors relating to the child’s 
relationships, cultural context and his/her particular perspectives and experiences (Alderson 
1993, p. 123). Having experienced a chronic illness for a number of years, for example, 
would clearly be relevant to a child’s capacity for making decisions in relation to that illness. 
There is evidence that such experience is a more indicative factor than age in assessing 
capacity (Chico and Hagger, 2011: 161). 
 
3.4 Protection (Article 3: The Best Interest of the Child) 
 
The Right to Protection from Harm 
 
The principle of the best interest as enshrined in Article 3 is many-faceted. It is, for example, 
a legal device for courts ensure that children’s interests are given due consideration in 
proceedings affecting them. It also has a protective function: Cave and Stavrinides make the 
point that ‘Article 3 places great responsibility on parents and public officials to protect the 
health and welfare interests of children’ (2013: 13). This is reflected in domestic law in 
systems all over the world. The Children Act 1989 stipulates that ‘the child’s welfare shall be 




the court’s paramount consideration’ although a child’s wishes will form part of that 
consideration. 
 
The basis for this paternalism is a recognition that children’s capacities are still evolving and, 
therefore, they are owed a duty of protection from activities likely to cause them harm, 
although this paternalism should diminish over time (Lansdown, 2005: x). States have 
obligations to all citizens to engage in a balancing act between autonomy and protection. 
Where children are making a decision which is disastrous to their health, such as resisting 
life-saving treatment for religious reasons (see e.g. Re E. [1993] 1 FLR 386), then the state 
has an obligation to override their immediate decision as failure to do so would prevent 
children from developing into autonomous agents (Cave, 2014: 111). This can be argued to 
be the case even for those who are Gillick competent, on the basis that special protection is 
owed to under-18s. The reason why controversy has arisen in terms of the inability of 
children to refuse consent is because treatment will not be offered unless it is in the child’s 
best interests (Cave and Stavrinides, 2013: 19). Therefore refusing is sometimes significantly 
different in outcome to consenting. It seems logical then that a difference is drawn between 
the two, and that autonomy must sometimes be overridden in favour of protection. 
 
The Nature of the Decision 
 
Many commentators emphasise that the same thresholds of capacity are not necessary for all 
decisions. The MCA’s approach is that capacity is ‘issue specific’: the question is whether a 
person has capacity to decide this particular question (Herring, 2016: 45), not all questions. 
Moreover, capacity is not a single, one-off event (British Medical Association, 2010: 4) or 
definitive. Ruck-Keene et al. for example found that in 12.5% of MCA cases, the individual 
in question was found to have capacity in relation to some issues but lack capacity in relation 
to others. In one case referred to, for example, the person was found to have capacity for 
sexual relations and marriage, but not to litigate these issues (2019: 66; see also S (Child as 
Parent - Adoption - Consent) [2017], para. 17).  
 
Likewise, in D Borough Council v AB the court stated that: ‘The terms of [Gillick] show 
clearly that the capacity in question is act and not person specific’ ([2011] EWHC 101 
(COP): para. 18). Cave opines that this means that a child’s ability to understand will depend 
on the complexities of a particular decision (2014: 106). The Committee notes that the 
importance of the matter may mean that assessing maturity accurately becomes more 
important (2009: para. 30). This is reflected in the fact that in the cases where serious medical 
issues are at play, courts may engage the expert evidence of a psychiatrist (and in family law 
cases there is sometimes reliance on psychologists’ evidence, see Section 2 above).  
 
The nature of the decision may also be significant not just for capacity, but to determine how 
much weight children’s wishes should have. Lansdown suggests a principle of proportionality 
with a sliding scale of capacity in accordance with the seriousness of the decision. Low-risk 
decisions would mean that children could take responsibility without demonstrating high 
capacity levels. For a child’s wishes to be overruled, one would have to demonstrate that the 
child does not understand the implications of the choice and the risk it poses to his/her best 
interests (Lansdown, 2005: x). 
 
Understand Hot and Cold Cognition: The Consequences for Criminal Behaviour 
 




The context of the decision will also be very relevant to considerations of capacity. This 
becomes particularly important in the context of children’s criminal behaviour. The United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice requires ‘a close 
relationship’ between children’s responsibility for criminal behaviour and ‘other social rights 
and responsibilities’ (Official commentary on Art 4(1)). Yet this is rarely achieved – in 
England and Wales, for example, the age of criminal responsibility for serious crimes is 10 
years (Children and Young Persons Act 1963, Section 16), yet the courts can overrule a 
child’s refusal to consent to medical treatment up to the age of 18 years (Re W (A Minor) 
(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, [1993] 1 FLR 1). This is ‘a 
dichotomy that appears not to have been subjected to detailed analysis’ (Lyons, 2010: 258). 
Lyons argues that if children are to be denied responsibility for their healthcare decisions, 
then when they commit crimes ‘they should be dealt with… by agencies outside of the 
criminal law’ (2010: 277). 
 
Available research on children’s capacities indicates that the context of the decision is crucial 
to whether adult-child differences will emerge for under-18s in their reasoning – ‘[i]n the heat 
of passion, in the presence of peers, on the spur of the moment, in unfamiliar situations’ 
adolescents may not reason as well as an adults might (Reyna and Farley, 2006: 1). This is 
because the prefrontal cortex, which prevents us from acting on impulse, is not yet fully 
developed (Blakemore, 2019: 135). Where adolescents can consult others, however, and 
consider their options at a measured pace, their decision-making abilities can match maturity 
attained in adulthood (Steinberg, 2005). Children become more adept at problem-solving 
when they have practised solving problems with parents or older children (Gay Hartman, 
2000: 1285; Vygotsky, 1978; Bronfenbrenner 1979). The difference in contexts has been 
described as ‘hot’ cognition – making decisions in a heightened emotional state; and ‘cold’ 
cognition – a more deliberative type of decision-making process in less stressful 
environments (Blakemore, 2019: 143-148; Albert and Steinberg, 2011). 
 
This points clearly, therefore, to why children’s capacity in different contexts should be 
treated distinctly; and why children should be considered to have greater potential for good 
decision-making in medical law as opposed to criminal law. The Committee astutely 
emphasises the need for ‘recognition that competence and understanding do not necessarily 
develop equally across all fields at the same pace and recognition of individual experience 
and capacity’ (General Comment No. 20: para. 20). The same child may have different 
abilities for decision-making in relation to a criminal matter and a medical law matter. Two 
children of the same age could have entirely different decision-making abilities in relation to 
the same matter because of individual differences. The context in which the decision is made, 




It is important to remain critical of the notion that children’s capacity can be measured in a 
straightforward way. However, law is often dichotomous in nature: guilty/not guilty; 
liable/not liable; rational/not rational (Lyons, 2010: 277), and judgment calls must sometimes 
be made about a child’s capacity. In such a binary context it is difficult to operationalise the 
principle of the evolving capacities of the child. It is significant however that Article 5 
emphasises the sliding scale of capacities that children move through as they grow to 
adulthood. Children’s ‘capacity rights’ therefore mean that, on relevant matters, children’s 
capacity must be assessed, and this should be done in accordance with children’s rights.  
 




Although ‘Gillick competence’ is supposed to be the standard for under-16s in England and 
Wales, the approach of the courts to assessing capacity can be vague and inconsistent. It is 
clear that children need a high level of understanding to be considered to have legal capacity 
in a certain area, and that they will have to demonstrate awareness of various risks and 
consequences (see e.g. An NHS Foundation Trust v A & Others). It remains challenging, 
however, for professionals to understand how to assess capacity and what ‘Gillick 
competence’ means in practice. The intuitive approach is generally satisfactory but it is 
important that it is informed by the CRC. This, it has been argued here, should specifically 
require: an appreciation of autonomy, because this is so valued in the liberal democracy; 
evidence, because this will ensure that childhood is properly understood; support, because 
capacity is not static but can be maximised; and protection, because it must be emphasised 
that with childhood comes relative vulnerability.  
 
In order to ensure that children’s capacity rights are met, and particularly to ensure that adults 
have a rounded understanding of capacity, there will have to be significant efforts made by 
states to ensure that medical professionals, lawyers, and others working with children are 
trained in children’s rights and child development. This is going to require significant 
investment, but it is an obligation that states undertake when they ratify the CRC, which 
requires that the provisions of the treaty are made widely known and that relevant 
professionals are trained accordingly (General Comment No. 12: para. 135).  
 
Although it may not necessarily be possible to objectively and precisely assess children’s 
capacity, insisting on understanding capacity through a children’s rights lens will at least 
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